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Muslim and Non-Muslim Adolescents’ Reasoning About Freedom
of Speech and Minority Rights
Maykel Verkuyten and Luuk Slooter
Universiteit Utrecht
An experimental questionnaire study, conducted in the Netherlands, examined adolescents’ reasoning about
freedom of speech and minority rights. Muslim minority and non-Muslim majority adolescents (12 – 18 years)
made judgments of different types of behaviors and different contexts. The groupmembership of participants had
a clear effect. Muslim participants were less in favor of freedom of speech if it involved the offending of religious
beliefs andweremore in favor ofMuslimminority rights. Therewere also cross-groupgenderdifferenceswhereby
parental practices that negatively affect females were more strongly rejected by Muslim females than by Muslim
males and non-Muslim females and males. The findings are discussed with reference to social-cognitive domain
theory and intergroup theories.
Freedoms and rights are of concern to people all over
the world. These issues are increasingly important
today due to several decades of increased migration
and the growing acknowledgment that many socie-
ties are now religiously, linguistically, ethnically, and
culturally diverse. Within democratic societies, the
development of adolescents’ judgments about free
speech and religious minority rights is an issue of
particular salience. This is because such societies
commonly see the teaching of tolerant reactions to
dissenting others as an important part of the sociali-
zation of their youth.
Adolescence is both a salient and critical period for
the learning of civil liberties and political tolerance
(e.g., Avery, 1989; Berti, 2005). This learning takes place
within the interpretations and representations circu-
lating within a given society. Current debates in many
Western societies focus on religious diversity and the
position of Islam in particular. Commentators and
politicians, for example, often argue that freedoms
and rights characterize Western democratic societies
and are of minimal concern to Muslims or even
contradictory to Islam. It is suggested and claimed
that the rights-based morality of Western societies
differs from the duty-based morality of Islam. This
difference would be symbolized by the debate on the
Danish cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed, the fatwa
against the British novelist Salman Rushdie, and the
murder of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh.
Hence, according to some commentators, there is an
ongoing ‘‘West –Muslim’’ cultural war, especially over
issues of free speech and religiousminority rights (e.g.,
Scroggins, 2005). Islam has moved to the center of
immigration and diversity debates and politics in
European countries (Zolberg & Long, 1999).
Thus, the development of reasoning about free
speech and Muslim minority rights among both non-
Muslim and Muslim adolescents is a key issue for
understanding intergroup relations in Western coun-
tries. To address this issue, we conducted a study with
majority group non-Muslim andminority groupMus-
lim participants between 12 and 18 years of age.
Various aspects of free speech and religious minority
rights were investigated, such as agent, social implica-
tions, and belief type. We used an experimental ques-
tionnaire design to examine these aspects aswell as the
effects of ethnic group, age, and gender.We conducted
our study in the Netherlands, one of the most secular
countries in the world (Te Grotenhuis & Scheepers,
2001). Theoretically, the research aims to combine
social-cognitive domain theory and intergroup theo-
ries. The research seeks tomakea contribution to recent
efforts to integrate these two theoretical frameworks.
The work of Killen and colleagues (Killen, Margie, &
Sinno, 2006; Killen, Sinno, & Margie, in press), for
example, has shown that ethnic and racial stereotypes
and prejudices enters into the social reasoning behind
exclusion and that children’s own ethnicity influences
how they evaluate social exclusion.
Freedom of Speech and Minority Rights
Freedom of speech and minority rights are neces-
sary for a diverse, equal, and democratic society. A
limited number of studies have examined the devel-
opment of judgments about freedom and rights in
different contexts. In two studies among children,
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adolescents, and young adults in North America,
Helwig (1995, 1997) examined freedom of speech
and freedom of religion in contexts of conflicting
considerations, such as psychological and physical
harm, and equality of opportunity. Helwig found
a fair amount of variation in the judgments and
younger participants were more likely than the older
ones to subordinate each freedom to preventing harm
and inequalities. Further, children were more con-
cernedwith psychological needs involved in freedom
of speech, whereas there was growing recognition of
the societal and democratic functions of free speech
during adolescence.
In another study in Canada, Helwig and Prencipe
(1999) examined children’s judgments about flag-
burning scenarios. Children found flag burning
offensive and 6-year-olds more than 8-year-olds and
10-year-olds said that there should be a law inCanada
and in other countries prohibiting flag burning. In
evaluating the scenarios, children were also found to
take the intentions of agents and the possible negative
consequences for others into account.
Turiel and Wainryb (1998) examined a non-Western
traditional cultural group: the Islamic Druze commu-
nity in northern Israel. As with the Helwig studies,
this community also endorsed freedom of speech and
religion, and the exercising of these rights was evalu-
ated in relation to moral, societal, and psychological
considerations. Further, cross-national studies have
shown that adolescents in different countries endorse
human rights but also evaluate these in relation to
different considerations and concerns, such as com-
munity welfare and social order (Clemence, Doise, de
Rosa, & Gonzalez, 1995).
The findings of these and other studies (seeHelwig
&Turiel, 2002;Neff&Helwig, 2002;Ruck,Abramovitch,
& Keating, 1998; Ruck, Peterson-Badali, & Day, 2002)
demonstrate the complex nature of adolescents’ judg-
ments and reasoning about civil liberties. Endorse-
ment of free speech and religious minority rights
appears to be contextual and dependent on the ways
that individuals coordinate and weigh different sorts
of knowledge. The theoretical implication is that the
social-cognitive domain model (see Smetana, 2006;
Turiel, 2002) seems more adequate for understanding
the development of social and political judgments
than a cognitive developmental framework that pro-
poses increasingly advanced stages of endorsement
of civil liberties (e.g., Enright & Lapsey, 1981; Enright,
Lapsey, Franklin, & Streuck, 1984).
The social-cognitive domain model emphasizes
that children and adolescents apply different do-
mains of knowledge in their social reasoning and
judgments. Not only moral considerations (fairness,
others’ welfare) but also social-conventional (group
norms, traditions) and psychological ones (self-
understanding, personal choices) are used for the
evaluation of a range of social events. This model
has been applied to complex issues and for under-
standing how individuals differ in the ways that they
categorize and evaluate social events. The enactment
of free speech andminority rights, for example,might
be seen as producing harm to people, as going against
conventional standards, or as threatening the position
and identity of one’s group.
However, social-cognitive domain investigations
into the endorsement of freedom of speech and
religious minority rights have not taken the inter-
group context into account. That is to say, the existing
research has not systematically examined and com-
pared the views of majority and minority group
members living in a religiously and culturally diverse
Western society such as the Netherlands. Social
psychological research has demonstrated that the
context of intergroup relationships affects children’s
and adolescents’ perceptions and evaluative judg-
ments (see Bennett & Sani, 2004). Many studies have
shown that negative stereotypes, prejudice, and
discrimination are pervasive in the lives of ethnic
minority youth (e.g., Fisher, Wallace, & Fenton, 2000;
McKown &Weinstein, 2003). For example, in a large-
scale national study in the Netherlands, Verkuyten
and Thijs (2002) found that ethnic minority group
early adolescents are more likely than Dutch children
to become the victims of ethnic name calling and
social exclusion. The highest level of experienced
ethnic name calling was found for the Islamic Turkish
children. Research has shown that these kinds of
experiences can have an impact on children’s moral
reasoning (see Killen et al., in press).
In the Netherlands, as in other countries, the
problems of a multicultural society are increasingly
discussed in relation to Islam. In the media, Islam has
become a symbol of problems related to ethnicminor-
ities and immigration (see Ter Wal, 2004). As a result,
public discussion focuses on the need to compel
Islamic groups to assimilate and to reject or seriously
limit Muslim minority rights. Appealing to the right
of free speech, leading politicians have publicly de-
scribed Islam as a ‘‘backward religion’’ that seriously
threatens Dutch secularized society and culture and
have definedMuslims as a ‘‘fifth column’’ and argued
for the need for a ‘‘cold war’’ against Islam (see
Scroggins, 2005; Verkuyten & Zaremba, 2005). Fur-
thermore, in 2005, the Pew Global Project Attitudes
found that 51% of the Dutch population declared
unfavorable opinions about Muslims. This was the
highest percentage of all countries examined. In
Reasoning About Civic Liberties 515
France, for example, the percentage was 36%, and in
Great Britain, it was 14%. In addition, of all groups in
the Netherlands, Muslims have on average the poor-
est academic results, irrespective of how academic
performance is defined, and theweakest labormarket
position.
It is likely that this intergroup context affects how
Muslim minority and non-Muslim majority adoles-
cents evaluate issues of freedom of speech and
Muslim minority rights, and the ways in which they
evaluate the different considerations and concerns.
Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and
optimal distinctiveness theory (Brewer, 1991) argue
that under identity threatening circumstances, people
will try to restore and reassert their threatened
collective identity. Furthermore, realistic group con-
flict theory emphasizes the role of group interest in
the dynamics of intergroup relations (e.g., Bobo, 1999;
Sherif, 1966). For minority groups, minority rights
offer the possibility of maintaining one’s own distinc-
tive culture and identity and obtaining a more equal
social status in society. Because of this, we expected
that when compared to non-Muslim participants,
Muslim participants would, on the whole, be less in
favor of free speech that negatively portrays religions
in general (and Islam in particular) and that they
would bemore in favor ofMuslimminority rights.We
did not, however, think it would necessarily mean
that Muslim participants would be less in favor of
freedom of speech in general and of other (non-
Muslim) group rights. When no intergroup concerns
are involved, Muslim and non-Muslim participants
were expected to give similar judgments.
Examining Judgments About Freedom of Speech and
Minority Rights
People can be both accepting and rejecting of civil
liberties because judgments seem to depend on many
factors, such as what and who people are asked to
accept, the way in which they are asked to be accept-
ing, and the underlying belief they are asked to
accept. Our study has four aspects for examining
judgments about freedom of speech and minority
rights. These aspects relate to political rights, to the
social consequences of effectuating rights, to the role
of underlying belief type, and to dimensions of
acceptance.
The first that we deal with here focuses on the
endorsement of political rights. The great majority of
existing research examines levels of political toler-
ance, particularly the endorsement of freedoms and
civil liberties. There are various studies on adoles-
cents’ political thinking and behavior (see Berti, 2005,
for a review). Among other things, these studies show
that adolescents tend to support democratic rights in
the abstract. However, similar to adults and in agree-
ment with the social-cognitive domain model, ado-
lescents often do not endorse the same rights in
concrete circumstances (Helwig, 1995). It is one thing
to endorse the freedom of speech in general, and
another thing to apply this freedom to, for example,
Muslim groups living in a secular country (Turiel,
2002). We focused on two concrete examples of
freedom of speech, namely the freedom to offend
others and the freedom to incite a war. Thus, we
presented freedom of speech as in conflict with
psychological harm and physical harm, respectively.
Additionally, we examined two specific minority
rights, namely, the right to found one’s own schools
and the right to demonstrate and protest. Both rights
are guaranteed by the Dutch constitution but were
presented as in conflict with the importance of social
integration in society and the importance of valuing
national identity. We used a between-subjects design
to compare the judgments toward Muslim and non-
Muslim groups claiming these freedoms and rights.
We expected that the non-Muslim majority partici-
pants would be less accepting toward the Muslim
than the non-Muslim group, whereas the Muslim
minority participants would be more accepting
toward the Muslims than the non-Muslims.
The second aspect we examined was the social
implications of particular acts performedbyMuslims.
Civil liberties always have limits and should be
evaluated in relation to other principles and values.
Most people do not support freedoms and rights
when they are in serious conflict with other consid-
erations and concerns. For example, one’s own free-
dom ends when it threatens the freedom of others.
Also, the right to act differently is limited by princi-
ples of equality and by operative public norms that
govern the civic relations between people (Parekh,
2000). In our research, we contrasted the freedom of
speech with the norm of not offending others. Fur-
thermore, the freedom of religious expression (wear-
ing of a headscarf) was contrasted with, respectively,
democratic principles and the operative public norm
of interpersonal communication. For all three con-
trasts, we used a between-subjects design in order to
make a distinction between ‘‘minimal’’ and ‘‘maxi-
mal’’ social implications. This distinction refers to the
extent to which the act contradicts the other principle
or norm; for example, freedomof speech in contrast to
ridiculing (minimal) or deeply offending (maximal)
people. It was expected that both Muslim and non-
Muslim participants would be less accepting in the
maximal compared to the minimal conditions. In
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addition, we expected that compared to non-Muslims,
Muslim minority participants would be less in favor
of free speech that offends religious beliefs and more
in favor of Muslim minority rights.
The third aspect we examined was how adoles-
cents’ judgments can depend on the underlying belief
type.Abasic distinction in belief type is betweenwhat
one believes to be true and what one believes to be
right. The former are beliefs about matters of fact and
the latter are value judgments. Across a broad age
range, developmental studies have found that chil-
dren and adolescents distinguish between informa-
tional and moral beliefs and use this distinction in
their judgments of social practices. For example,
in a study among an ethnically mixed sample from
the San Francisco Bay area, Wainryb (1993) showed
that children and adolescents (9 – 23 years) contextu-
alized their own judgments when they apply them to
unknown cultural out-groups (‘‘a country’’) with
different informational beliefs (what they believe to
be true) but not when they apply them to out-groups
with different moral beliefs (what they believe to be
right). In another study among European Americans,
Wainryb, Shaw, and Maianu (1998) found that chil-
dren and early adolescents (7 – 14 years) are more
tolerant when the underlying dissenting beliefs were
informational as opposed to moral.
Hence, the distinction between what one believes
to be true andwhat one believes to be right seems to be
important for judgments about minority rights. One
reason for this is that the type of underlying belief can
be used to infer intentions behind the practice that one
dislikes or rejects but is asked to accept. Ignorance and
misinformation can be inferred from informational
dissent, whereas badness or immorality is a more
likely inference from moral dissent. Following pre-
vious studies, we expected participants to be more
accepting of Muslim and non-Muslim ‘‘harmful’’
practices based on informational beliefs than on
moral beliefs. We used a between-subjects design to
examine this expectation. Further, we examined the
evaluation of practices of Muslim parents (female
circumcision and gender differentiation) and of non-
Muslim parents (home education and child vaccina-
tion) and we expected that non-Muslim majority
participantswouldbe less accepting toward the former
than Muslim participants. However, both groups
of participants were not expected to differ in their
evaluation of practices of non-Muslim parents be-
cause in that case no intergroup concerns are at stake.
In addition to examining the effects of varying the
content of the underlying beliefs, the fourth aspect we
focused on was the different ways in which people
may be asked to endorse minority rights. Accepting
that people have a right to hold dissenting beliefs does
not have to imply that one tolerates the public expres-
sion of such beliefs or the actual practices based on such
beliefs (Vogt, 1997). These dimensions of tolerance can
trigger different levels of endorsement. In their study,
Wainryb et al. (1998) found, for example, that Euro-
pean American children and early adolescents were
more accepting of dissenting speech than practices
(see also Witenberg, 2002). In the present study, we
focused on the judgment of actual dissenting practi-
ces by Muslim and non-Muslim parents toward their
children and of the public expression aimed at trying
to convince other parents to act similarly. In general,
we expected that adolescents of both groups of par-
ticipants would be relatively accepting toward public
expressions because this is linked to freedom of
speech, can be thought to stimulate debate, and does
not directly cause harm or injustice to other people
(see Wainryb et al., 1998). In contrast, actual practices
based on dissenting beliefs can involve harmful and
unfair consequences and therefore we expected less
acceptance for this dimension.
Age and Gender
Enright and Lapsey (1981) have described a devel-
opmental progression from a generally intolerant
attitude during the childhood years through to
increasingly tolerant judgments during adolescence
(see also Enright et al., 1984). The sequence they
proposed runs parallel with changes in perspective
taking and Kohlberg’s stages of moral development.
Other studies have found similar age-related changes,
which are attributed to increasingly complex and
principled forms of reasoning (e.g., Bobo & Licardi,
1989; Thalhammer, Wood, Bird, Avery, & Sullivan,
1994).
However, there are also studies that do not find age
differences in moral judgments (e.g., Wainryb, 1993)
or find that older adolescents are less tolerant than
younger ones (e.g., Witenberg, 2002). In developmen-
tal stage studies, tolerance is typically examined as
a single, global construct and dimensions of tolerance
and types of dissenting beliefs and practices are not
considered. Studies that do take different aspects of
tolerance into account give a more complex picture of
age differences with tolerance and intolerance coex-
isting at all ages (e.g., Wainryb et al., 1998). More
importantly, studies on children’s and adolescents’
reasoning about civil liberties do not find support for
a global stage interpretation (e.g. Helwig, 1995, 1997;
Ruck et al., 1998). Rather, with age, early-developed
concepts of rights and freedoms are increasingly
assessed with other considerations and concerns,
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including the intergroup context. In contrast to young
children (early), adolescents tend to make more
context-sensitive judgments about freedoms and
rights. The context dependence of the endorsement
of civil liberties makes it unlikely that there is an age-
related global developmental trend in our adolescent
sample. Hence, we did not expect a consistent posi-
tive effect for age.
Killen and colleagues have found gender differ-
ences in children’s reasoning about ethnic and racial
exclusion. Compared to girls, boys find exclusion
more acceptable and more often use conventional
reasoning and stereotypes in justifying their evalua-
tions (Killen et al., in press). Other research from the
cognitive domain approach, however, has found few
gender differences (Smetana, 2006). Further, studies
on the development of judgments of freedoms and
rights have either not examined gender differences
(e.g., Helwig & Prencipe, 1999; Ruck et al., 2002) or
found no differences between females and males
(e.g., Helwig, 1995, 1997; Sigelman & Toebben, 1992).
However, femalesmay experience greater restrictions
in their choices, freedoms, and opportunities, and
these experiences can affect moral and social judg-
ments (Turiel, 2002). Analyses and perceptions of
differences between the Western and the Muslim
world emphasize differential gender relationships.
The ideal of egalitarian gender arrangements in
Western societies is contrasted with the patriarchal
and unequal gender relations in Muslim communi-
ties. Obedience to the father and theplacing of various
restrictions on the activities of females (e.g., regarding
leisure time, sexuality, marriage, and the distribution
of household tasks) is more common in some of these
communities. Endorsement of Muslim minority rights
involving women’s clothing and gender arrange-
ments and practices were considered in our study,
and we explored whether male and female partici-
pants differ in their judgments of these practices.
Current Study
To summarize, the main purpose of this investiga-
tion was to examine the contextual nature and devel-
opment of reasoning about freedom of speech and
minority rights among Muslim minority and non-
Muslim majority adolescents. The study focuses on
different forms and aspects of this reasoning by
examining types of freedom of speech and types of
minority rights, contrasting values, belief type, and
dimensions of acceptance. In general, we expected
that compared to non-Muslims, Muslim participants
would be less endorsing of freedom of speechwhen it
involves offending religious beliefs and to be more
endorsing of Muslim minority rights. In addition,
both Muslim and non-Muslim adolescents were ex-
pected to be less accepting of practices that are more
difficult to reconcile with other values, to be less
accepting of practices based on dissenting moral
beliefs than informational beliefs, and to be less
accepting toward actual acts as opposed to public
speech.We also examined age andgenderdifferences.
Gender differences were explored, and we did not
expect a consistent effect for age.
Research on freedoms, rights, and tolerance often
lacks relevance and ecological validity. Studies have
examined, for example, the endorsement of abstract
principles such as freedom of speech and freedom of
religion. However, principle considerations differ
from support for practical implications and situa-
tions. Most debates on freedoms, rights, and diversity
are not about principles per se but rather about
whether a principle is appropriate for a specific case
at hand and how exactly it should be interpreted.
Furthermore, studies that do use concrete examples,
for example, in dilemmas and vignettes, tend to use
rather unfamiliar and hypothetical scenarios. In our
study,we tried tomaximize the relevance and validity
of the research by using cases and situations that
currently are, or recently were, debated in Dutch
society.
In this study, we are interested in the endorsement
of free speech and minority rights among non-
Muslim majority adolescents and Muslim minority
group peers. Our focus is on the status difference
between the majority and the minority group. In
examining this difference, we considered it important
to consider religiousness. It is likely that the Muslim
participants are much more religious than the Dutch
non-Muslims. Therefore, we assessed participants
self-report of their own religiousness and took this
variable into account in the analyses.
Method
Participants
The sample included 557 participants between 12
and 18 years of age (M5 14.99, SD5 1.72) from three
schools. In total, 49.9% were females and 50.1% were
males. Females and males did not differ significantly
for age. All participants followed upper general sec-
ondary education (HAVO/VWO: ‘‘Higher General
Secondary Education’’/‘‘Preparatory Scientific Edu-
cation’’). The non-Muslim group consisted of 324
adolescents (49.6% females, mean age 5 14.57 years;
50.4% males, mean age 5 14.66) with two ethnically
Dutch parents. The mean age of females and males
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within this group did not differ significantly. The
Muslim group was composed of 231 Muslim adoles-
cents (53.7% females, mean age 5 15.23 years; 46.3%
males, mean age 5 15.14 years) with Dutch citizen-
ship, but whose parents came to the Netherlands as
immigrants from countries such as Turkey, Morocco,
Iran, Iraq, and Bosnia. The mean age of females and
males within this group did not differ significantly.
The gender distribution was similar in both groups,
v2(1, 556)5 2.62, p. .10. However, theMuslim group
was somewhat older (M 5 15.19, SD5 1.77) than the
non-Muslim group (M 5 14.61, SD 5 1.46), t(556) 5
4.28, p , .001. The two groups attended the same
ethnically heterogeneous schools and took classes
together. The adolescents were asked to participate
in a study on current societal issues. Theyparticipated
on a voluntary basis and the anonymous paper-and-
pencil questionnaire was administered in separate
class sessions and under supervision. All students in
the different classes agreed to participate in the study.
There was no information available on the socio-
economic backgrounds of the students.
Design and Measures
For examining the contextual nature of adoles-
cents’ judgments about free speech and Muslim
minority rights, an experimentally questionnaire
design with different types of scenarios were used.
Because we expected the different judgments to
be relatively independent, the measures were not
counterbalanced but given in a fixed order. Several
of these scenarios have been used in a previous study
(Verkuyten & Slooter, 2007).
First, two scenarios measured the endorsement of
free speech. For the first scenario, there were two
conditions (between subjects): (a) ridiculing religion
(‘‘Should it be allowed that amagazine uses drawings
and words to make God and religion ridiculous?’’)
and (b) racist views (‘‘Should it be allowed that racist
groups express their views in the media?’’). Two
statements followed the scenario in each condition:
(a) offensive content (‘‘No, because this is offending
to some groups in society’’) and (b) free speech (‘‘Yes,
because there is always the right of free speech’’).
Responses to these statements were scored using
5-point scales ranging from totally do not agree (2)
to totally agree (2).
The second scenario also had two conditions
(between subjects): (a) incite war against Islam
(‘‘Should it be allowed that on the Internet people
can incite a war against Islam?’’) and (b) call for Jihad
(‘‘Should it be allowed that on the Internet people can
call for the Jihad?’’). In each condition, two statements
(with 5-point scales) followed the scenario: (a) inciting
violence (‘‘No, because this incites violence’’) and
(b) free speech (‘‘Yes, because there is free speech’’).
For both scenarios, the level of agreement with the
two statements was strongly related (r 5 .72 and
r 5 .64, respectively). Therefore, we reversed the
score of one of the two questions and computed two
average scores whereby a higher score indicates
a stronger endorsement of free speech.
Second, two scenarios were used to measure the
endorsement of Muslim minority rights. The first sce-
nario, with two conditions (between subjects), con-
cerned the founding of separate schools: (a) Islamic
schools (‘‘Should people have the right to found
Islamic schools to which only Muslims can go?’’)
and (b) elite schools (‘‘Should people have the right
to found expensive elite schools to which only chil-
dren of very rich parents can go?’’). Two statements
(with 5-point scales) followed the scenario in each
condition: (a) social cohesion (‘‘No, because this is bad
for social cohesion in society’’) and (b) right of
education (‘‘Yes, because one should always respect
the right of freedom of education’’).
The second scenario was concerned with the right
to demonstrate and protest. There were again two
conditions (between subjects): (a)Muslimdemonstra-
tion (‘‘A group of Muslims wants to hold a demon-
stration against the anti-Muslim feelings in the
Netherlands. Is it ok when they burn the Dutch flag
during the demonstration?’’) and (b) Surinamese
demonstration (‘‘A group of Surinamers wants to
hold a demonstration against the Dutch history of
slavery. Is it ok when they burn the Dutch flag during
the demonstration?’’). The Surinamese are one of the
largest minority groups and they originate from the
former Dutch colony of Surinam in South America.
The two statements (with 5-point scales) following
both versions were (a) Dutch identity (‘‘No, because
that is a lack of respect for Dutch identity’’) and (b)
right to protest (‘‘Yes, because every group has the
right to demonstrate and protest’’). For both scenar-
ios, the level of agreement with the two statements
was strongly related (r 5 .70 and r 5 .61, respec-
tively). Thus, we reversed the score of one of the two
questions and computed two average scoreswhereby
a higher score was indicative of a stronger endorse-
ment of Muslim minority rights.
Third, to examine whether judgments toward free
speech and Muslim minority practices depended on
the social implications or the degree to which these are
contradictory with other values and norms (minimal
and maximal), we used three scenarios. One about
free speech and two about women’s clothing (in this
case, a headscarf). Each scenario had either a ‘‘minimal’’
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version in which the practice had rather modest
implications or a ‘‘maximal’’ version in which the
practice hadmore far-reaching consequences. Partici-
pants were presented with either the minimal or the
maximal versions for all three scenarios (between
subjects).
The first scenario was on freedom of speech: (a)
minimal condition (‘‘Freedom of speech is an import-
ant value in our society. Another important value is
that you should not offend people. Imagine that a film
director makes a film in which he makes a fool of
religious people’’) and (2) maximal condition (‘‘. . .
makes a film in which he causes deep offence to those
of religious persuasion’’). Following the scenario in
each condition, the participants were asked, ‘‘What
should the film company do with this film?’’ There
were four response categories: (a) ‘‘Definitely not
release the film’’; (b) ‘‘Try to convince the director to
change the film, but not release the filmwhen he does
not agree’’; (c) ‘‘Try to convince the director to change
the film, but release it when he does not agree’’; and
(d) ‘‘Do nothing and release the film.’’
The second scenario was on politics and religious
expression (clothing) and there were two conditions:
(a) minimal (‘‘Democracy and people’s freedom to
make their own choices are central values in Dutch
society. Imagine that an Islamic political party gets the
majority vote in a local election in a Dutch city or
village. This party can then decide to make the area
more Islamic by asking women to wear a headscarf’’)
and (b) maximal (‘‘. . . to make the area more Islamic
by making the wearing of a headscarf obligatory’’).
The level of acceptance was judged by asking the
participants, ‘‘What should the Dutch government
do about this party’s decision?’’ There were four
response categories: (a) ‘‘Simply not accept this deci-
sion’’; (b) ‘‘Try to convince the party to reconsider the
decision, but forbid it when they do not agree’’; (c)
‘‘Try to convince the party to reconsider the decision,
but allow it when they do not agree’’; and (d) ‘‘Do
nothing and accept it.’’
The third scenario was about clothing at school.
There were again two conditions: (a) minimal (‘‘It is
important in Dutch society that people can commu-
nicate with each other in an open way. Another
important value is that people themselves can decide
which clothes they like to wear. Imagine that there is
a group of pupils at your school that voluntarily
decides to wear a headscarf that covers only their
hair’’) and (b) maximal (‘‘. . . that not only covers their
hair but also their face’’). The participants were asked
what the school should do about this: (a) ‘‘Simply not
accept it’’; (b) ‘‘Try to convince them, but expel them
from school when they do not agree’’; (c) ‘‘Try to
convince them, but allow it when they do not agree’’;
and (d)‘‘Do nothing and accept it.’’
Fourth, to examine two dimensions andparticipants’
acceptance of minority practices based on different
beliefs, four scenarios were used. Two were related to
perceived Muslim practices and two others were not.
All four were similar in that they involved the
behavior of parents toward their children based on
either an informational belief or a moral belief
(between subjects). The twoMuslim stories described
parents who (from aWestern point of view) engage in
a harmful or unfair practices. The first story was on
female circumcision that is taken to refer to Islam
because it is understood in this way in public dis-
course and debate. The practice, however, originated
long before the spread of Islam and is also conducted
in societies that are not Muslim (Gregg, 2005). The
female circumcision story had two conditions: (a)
informational belief (‘‘A very light form of female
circumcision is sometimes compared with male cir-
cumcision. Some parents practice this light form
because they think it is good for the healthy physical
development of girls’’) and (b) moral belief (‘‘. . .
because they think it is required by their religion
and culture’’). The second story was on gender
differentiation: (a) informational belief (‘‘A Muslim
father allows his sons to go out as often as they like,
but he forbids his daughters to do the same. The father
does this because of the fact that girls run more risks
and are more vulnerable’’) and (b) moral belief (‘‘. . .
because he finds it good and right that boys havemore
freedom than girls’’).
The two non-Muslim stories also described parents
who engage in practices that are uncommon in Dutch
society. One was on home education: (a) informa-
tional belief (‘‘Some parents prefer to educate their
children at home rather than send them to school.
These parents think that with home-education, chil-
dren learn better andmuchmore than at school’’) and
(b) moral belief (‘‘. . . that they have the right to raise
their children the way they want to’’). The other story
was on vaccination: (a) informational belief (‘‘There
are parents that do not let their young children be
vaccinated against all kinds off diseases. They do this
because they think that vaccination hampers the
development of the natural body resistance’’) and
(2) moral belief (‘‘. . . that vaccination goes against
their convictions about life’’).
For each of the four scenarios, two dimensions of
acceptance were tapped by assessing participants’
judgments about the act itself (act) and parents
campaigning to convince other parents to do the same
(public speech). For the ‘‘act,’’ the questions were, re-
spectively, ‘‘Should it be allowed that parents have
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their daughters circumcised in this way?’’ ‘‘Should it
be allowed that the father treats his sons and daugh-
ters differently?’’ ‘‘Should it be allowed that parents
do not send their children to school?’’ and ‘‘Should it
be allowed that these parents do not vaccinate their
young children?’’ There were 5-point scales ranging
from no, certainly not (1) to yes, certainly (5). For ‘‘public
speech,’’ the questions, with the same 5-point scales,
askedwhether it should be allowed that these parents
campaign in order to try to convince other parents to
do the same.
Finally, for measuring the adolescents’ self-reported
religiousness, two statements were presented and the
participants were asked to indicate their level of
agreement with each using a 5-point scale ranging
from totally do not agree to totally agree. The two items
were ‘‘God and religious rules are themost important
guidelines in my life’’ and ‘‘I find it very important to
be religious.’’ The responses for both statements were
highly correlated and Cronbach’s alpha was .91.
Results
After examining differences in adolescents’ self-
reported religiousness, the results for the adolescents’
reasoning about freedom of speech and minority
rights are divided into four sections: (a) freedom of
speech, (b) Muslim minority rights, (c) social im-
plications (minimal and maximal), and (d) beliefs
and dimensions of minority practices. The different
judgments were examined using general linear
model (GLM) univariate andmultivariate procedures
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Between-subjects analy-
seswere conducted, inwhich experimental condition,
participant group, and gender were included as
factors, and age and (the covariate) religiousness as
continuous variables. Significant interaction effects
where examined using simple slope analysis and post
hoc tests (Tukey’shonestly significantdifference [HSD]).
We first examined whether there were differences
in adolescents’ self-reported religiousness between
the two groups of participants (non-Muslims vs.
Muslims), between males and females, and for age.
The GLM univariate procedure indicated a strong
effect for participant group, F(1, 551)5 99.89, p, .001,
g2p 5 .26. The mean score for the Muslim minority
group (M5 4.22, SD5 0.93) indicated high religious-
ness, whereas the mean score for the non-Muslim
majority groupwas on the ‘‘disagree’’ side of the scale
(M 5 2.15, SD 5 1.05). For the Muslim group, 83% of
the participants scored above the neutral midpoint of
the scale, whereas for the non-Muslim, 81.5% scored
below the midpoint, indicating that the majority had
a secular orientation. There was also a significant
effect for age, F(1, 551) 5 11.74, p 5 .001, g2p 5 .02.
Older adolescents were more religious than younger
adolescents (B 5 .15). There was also a significant
interaction effect between participant group and
gender, F(1, 551) 5 6.58, p 5 .011, g2p 5 .01. Post hoc
analysis showed that there was no gender difference
for the non-Muslim group, but Muslim females
scored significantly higher than Muslim males (M 5
4.38, M 5 4.05, respectively). No other significant
effects were found.
Freedom of Speech
The participants were asked to what extent people
should have freedom of speech in the media. There
were two scenarios: making religious offensive state-
ments and rallying for war. The mean scores for both
freedoms were below the neutral midpoint of the
scales (M 5 0.61, SD 5 1.28, and M 5 1.12, SD 5
1.05, respectively) indicating that the participants
tended to reject the affirmation of both freedoms. A
paired sample t test indicated that the rejection was
stronger for rallying forwar than formaking offensive
statements, t(556)5 7.55, p, .001. The two measures
were also unrelated (r 5 .08, p . .05).
For the freedom tomake offensive statements, there
were two conditions (between subjects): ridiculing
religion and racist statements. The GLM procedure
indicated that the full model accounted for 22% of the
variance. The results indicated a significant negative
effect for the covariate religiousness, F(1, 551)5 21.11,
p , .001, g2p 5 .04. Religious participants were more
strongly against freedom of speech than nonreligious
participants. In addition, there was a main effect for
participant group. This effect was qualified, however,
by a significant interaction effect with condition,
F(1, 551) 5 9.79, p 5 .002, g2p 5 .02. Table 1 indicates
that compared to non-Muslim participants, the Mus-
lims were more strongly against freedom of speech
that involves the ridiculing or offending of God and
religion.
There were also two conditions for the second
scenario on the freedom to incite or rally for war:
war against Islam and the Jihad. The full model
explained 9.2% of the variance. The GLM procedure
indicated that the covariate religiousness was not
significant. There was a significant main effect for
condition and this effect was qualified by two signifi-
cant interaction effects: between condition and par-
ticipant group, F(1, 551) 5 4.68, p 5 .031, g2p 5 .01,
and between condition and gender, F(1, 551)5 9.47, p5
.002, g2p 5 .02. For the former interaction effect, Table 1
shows that both the Muslim and the non-Muslim
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participants rejected rallying for a war against Islam
more strongly than they rejected calling for the Jihad,
but the rejection was strongest among the Muslims.
The latter interaction effect indicated that compared
tomales, femalesweremore strongly against a call for
war against Islam (M 5 1.23, and M 5 1.49,
respectively) and less strongly against mobilizing
for the Jihad (M51.01, andM5.72, respectively).
Muslim Minority Rights
The participants were asked to what extent people
have the right to establish separate schools and to
demonstrate and protest. The mean scores for both
rights were below the neutral midpoint of the scales
(M 5 0.15, SD 5 1.37, and M 5 0.75, SD 5 1.20,
respectively) indicating that the participants tended
to reject the effectuation of both rights. A paired
sample t test indicated that the rejection was stronger
for the right to demonstrate than the right to establish
separate schools, t(556) 5 8.54, p , .001. The two
measures were positively related (r5 .17, p, .01) but
the association was low indicating a limited amount
of shared variance (, 4%).
For the right to found separate schools, there were
two conditions: Islamic and elite schools. The full
model explained 18.5% of the variance. The GLM
procedure indicated a main effect for condition that
was, however, qualified by an interaction effect
between condition and participant group, F(1, 551) 5
58.12, p , .001, g2p 5 .11, and between condition and
gender,F(1, 551)5 8.01, p5 .002,g2p5 .02.As shown in
Table 1, the non-Muslimparticipants rejected this right
more strongly for the Islamic schools than for the elite
schools. In contrast, the Muslim participants endorsed
the right to found separate schools more strongly for
Muslims than for very rich parents. Additionally,
females were more in favor of the right to found
separate schools in the case of Muslim actors (M 5
0.37) compared to nonreligious actors (M 5 0.49),
whereas males were equally rejecting toward both
actors (M50.15 andM50.17, respectively). There
were no other significant effects, also not for the
covariate religiousness.
The right to demonstrate had also two conditions:
Muslims and Surinamers. The GLM procedure indi-
cated that the full model explained 12.4% of the
variance. There was a main effect for age, F(1, 549) 5
8.94, p 5 .002, g2p 5 .03. The age effect was negative
(B 5 .14) indicating that older adolescents rejected
the right to demonstrate more strongly than the
younger ones. Therewas also a significant main effect
for participant group that was, however, qualified by
an interaction effect between participant group and
condition, F(1, 549) 5 12.75, p , .001, g2p 5 .02. As
shown in Table 1, for the non-Muslim participants,
the rejection was stronger for the Muslim condition
than for the Surinamers condition. In contrast, the
Muslim participants endorsed this right more
strongly for the Muslim condition.
Social Implications: Minimal and Maximal
The participants were asked tomake judgments on
a story about the freedomof speech and on two stories
about Muslim minority rights involving the clothing
(headscarf) of women. There were two conditions
of each scenario that were varied in a between-
subjects design: minimal implications and maximal
implications.
Examining the free speech score as a dependent
variable indicated that the full model accounted for
11.3% of the variance. The GLM procedure showed
that there was a main negative effect for religious-
ness, F(1, 551) 5 8.12, p 5 .005, g2p 5 .02. There was
also amain effect for gender, F(1, 551)5 9.24, p, .003,
Table 1
AdjustedMeans (Controlling for Religiousness) and StandardDeviations
(BetweenBrackets) for Freedomof Speech andMuslimMinorityRights for




Secular .41 (1.32) 1.05 (0.95) .71 (1.35)
Racist .50 (1.18) .68 (1.12) .56 (1.21)
Free speech
War on Islam 1.22 (1.08) 1.50 (0.73) 1.39 (0.97)
Jihad .93 (1.06) .82 (1.15) .85 (1.09)
Minority rights
Founding schools
Islamic schools .47 (1.26) .84 (1.18) .16 (1.38)
Elite schools .06 (1.33) .71 (1.23) .33 (1.34)
Demonstration
Muslims 1.21 (0.93) .21 (1.34) .77 (1.21)




Minimal 2.31 (1.01) 2.05 (1.01) 2.15 (1.02)
Maximal 1.95 (1.05) 1.99 (0.99) 1.99 (1.04)
Headscarf
Minimal 2.74 (0.88) 3.32 (0.79) 3.03 (0.90)
Maximal 2.43 (0.87) 3.16 (.0.72) 2.79 (0.91)
Note. For freedom of speech and minority rights, 5-point scales (2
to 2). For minimal –maximal, 4-point scales (1 to 4).
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g2p 5 .03. Compared to females, males were less
against free speech in which religious people are
offended (M 5 1.92, M 5 2.23, respectively). Age
was also found to have a significant main effect,
F(1, 551) 5 6.96, p 5 .009, g2p 5 .03. Younger adoles-
cents were more rejecting than older ones (B5 .12).
Additionally, we found a main effect for condition
that was qualified by a significant interaction effect
between condition and participant group, F(1, 551)5
5.44, p 5 .020, g2p 5 .01. As shown in Table 1, non-
Muslimparticipantsweremore in favor of free speech
in the minimal compared to the maximal condition,
whereas there was no difference between both con-
ditions for the Muslim participants.
The judgments for the two stories on Muslim
minority rights (headscarf) were strongly correlated
(r 5 .64; therefore, an average score was used. For
this score, the full model explained 32.2% of the
variance. There was a positive effect for the covariate
religiousness, F(1, 551) 5 7.76, p 5 , .006, g2p 5 .02.
The main effect for condition was also significant,
F(1, 551) 5 11.31, p , .001, g2p 5 .04. As shown in
Table 1, the participants were more accepting in the
minimal compared to the maximal condition. This
effect was found for both the Muslim and the non-
Muslim participants because the interaction between
condition and participant group was not significant.
There were two other significant main effects: for
participant group and for age. These effects were
qualified, however, by a significant interaction effect
among participant group, age, and gender, F(3, 551)5
8.33, p, .001, g2p 5 .03. Simple slope analysis showed
a positive age effect for non-Muslim males (B 5 .16,
p , .001). Thus, older non-Muslim males were less
accepting than non-Muslim younger males. Further,
there was a positive age effect for Muslim females
(B 5 19.4, p , .001). Muslim older females were less
accepting than Muslim younger females. Age did not
have a significant effect for non-Muslim females and
for Muslim males.
Beliefs and Dimensions of Minority Practices
The participants were asked to judge four scenar-
ios, two of which were concerned with non-Muslim
minority practices and two with Muslim minority
practices. For the four scenarios, two dimensions of
practices were tapped: performing the actual act and
seeking public support by campaigning for it. In
addition, the type of belief forming the basis of the
act was varied in a between-subjects design by
presenting half of the participants with a moral argu-
ment and the other half with an informational
argument.
Repeated measures analyses with dimension as
within-subjects measures and belief type, participant
group, gender, and age as variables indicated for all
four scenarios that the participants weremore accept-
ing of campaigning for public support than for
performing the actual act itself (ps , .001, r2 between
.13 and .24). Hence, we found a clear dimension effect
for all four scenarios. This effect was similar for
Muslim and non-Muslim participants, for males and
females, and for the different ages.
Act Performance
The highest correlation between the four judg-
ments about performing the act in the four scenarios
was 0.17. This pattern of associations was similar for
the non-Muslim and Muslim participants and inde-
pendent of age. An initial one-way analysis contrast-
ing the four scenarios revealed a significant effect,
F(3, 554) 5 25.75, p , .001, g2p 5 .11. Participants
accepted female circumcision the least (M 5 1.90),
followed by nonvaccination (M 5 2.04), and then by
home education (M5 2.33) and differential treatment
(M 5 2.35). Except for the latter two scores, all pair-
wise mean differences were statistically significant
(paired samples t tests, ps, .01). All the mean scores
were also below the neutral midpoint of the scale (3),
indicating that, in general, the participant did not
support any of the actions.
The four ‘‘act performance’’ judgments were ana-
lyzed as multiple dependent variables. The multivar-
iate effects (Pillai’s) were significant for belief type,
participant group, gender, age, and religiousness.
In addition, there were significant multivariate inter-
action effects between participant group and gender,
F(4, 552) 5 6.03, p 5 .002, g2p 5 .06, and between
gender and age, F(4, 551) 5 2.64, p 5 .032, g2p 5 .02.
The univariate results indicated that religiousness
was positively and significantly related to accepting
three of the four acts: The effect for female circumci-
sion was the exception.
The univariate results further indicated that belief
type only made a difference for home education,
F(1, 551)5 4.86, p5 .038, g2p 5 .01, and for differential
treatment, F(1, 551)5 11.25, p, .001,g2p 5 .03, but not
for female circumcision and for nonvaccination. Par-
ticipants found it more acceptable when home edu-
cation was based on informational beliefs compared
tomoral beliefs (M5 2.46 andM5 2.21, respectively).
In addition, participants found differential gender
treatment more acceptable when this was based on
informational beliefs rather than on moral beliefs
(M 5 2.56 and M 5 2.19, respectively). There were
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no significant interaction effects between belief type
and age, gender, or participant group.
The univariate results indicated effects of partici-
pant group for female circumcision and differential
gender treatment. Both these effects were qualified
by significant interaction effects between partici-
pant group and gender: for female circumcision,
F(1, 551)5 9.81, p5 .002, g2p 5 .02, and for differential
treatment, F(1, 551) 5 11.39, p , .001, g2p 5 .04. The
results for this interaction are presented in Table 2.
The table indicates that there is a clear gender
difference among the Muslim participants but not
among the non-Muslims. Compared to Muslim
males, Muslim females were less accepting toward
female circumcision and differential gender treat-
ment,F(1, 231)5 21.35, p, .001. For the non-Muslims,
the gender difference was not significant, F(1, 334) 5
3.69, p . .05.
For female circumcision, there was a further inter-
action effect between age and gender, F(1, 551)5 8.92,
p, .003,g2p5 .02. Simple slope analysis indicated that
older females were less accepting toward female
circumcision than younger females (B 5 .09, p ,
.007). There was no significant age effect for males
(B 5 .01, p . .10).
For home education, the univariate results showed
a significant negative effect for age, F(1, 551) 5 4.91,
p 5 .027, g2p 5 .01 (B 5 .13). There was also
a significant interaction effect between participant
group and gender, F(1, 551)5 4.75, p5 .039, g2p 5 .01.
As shown in Table 2, female Muslims were less
supportive of this practice than the other participants.
Campaigning for Public Support
For the four scenarios, the judgments about parents
seeking public support by campaigning for it were
significantly related (r . .43). Therefore, we used an
average score for analyzing these responses, and
Cronbach’s alpha was 0.78. The GLM procedure
indicated that there was a significant positive effect
for religiousness, F(1, 551) 5 3.67, p 5 .048, g2p 5 .01.
There was also a significant effect for participant
group, F(1, 551) 5 4.89, p 5 .032, g2p 5 .01, with non-
Muslim participants accepting the campaigning for
public support more strongly than Muslim partici-
pants (M 5 2.63 and M 5 2.47, respectively). In
addition, there was a gender difference, F(1, 551) 5
7.40, p , .001, g2p 5 .02. Males were more accepting
(M 5 2.75) than females (M 5 2.37). No other effects
were significant. The full model accounted for 6.8%
of the variance.
Discussion
This research examines hownon-Muslim andMuslim
adolescents living in the Netherlands reason about
free speech and Muslim minority rights. In trying to
maximize the relevance and ecological validity of the
research, we focused on concrete cases rather than
abstract principles, used realistic and currently
debated issues instead of unfamiliar and hypothetical
scenarios, and presented the participants with con-
flicting issues.
In general, the participants expressed low to mod-
erate levels of acceptance and endorsement of free-
dom of speech and minority rights in the various
conflicting situations. In agreement with social-
cognitive domain theory and research (e.g., Helwig,
1995; Helwig & Turiel, 2002; Wainryb, 1993), these
civil liberties were not applied absolutely across the
various conflicts. Further, the different judgments
were not strongly associated, indicating that no single
construct of acceptance or endorsement emerged.
The low associations also suggest that it is unlikely
that the fixed order in which the measures were
presented affected the findings. In addition,we found
that the endorsement of free speech and minority
rightswas sensitive to the context of beliefs and group
memberships. Adolescents take into account various
aspects of what they are asked to accept and who’s
freedom of speech and rights they are expected to
endorse. The content and the nature of the social
implications, the dimension of acceptance, and the
underlying beliefs, all made a difference to the
judgments.
The group membership of the actor and of the
participants also was important. The rejection of
freedom of speech was stronger among the Muslim
than the non-Muslim participants when it involved
offending God and religion and when it concerned
Table 2
Adjusted Mean Scores (Controlling for Religiousness) and Standard
Deviations (Between Brackets) for the Four Parental Practices for
Religious Group by Gender
Non-Muslims Muslims
Females Males Females Males
Female circumcision 1.96 (1.02) 2.19 (1.04) 1.35 (0.90) 2.09 (1.14)
Differential gender
treatment
2.01 (1.13) 2.25 (1.12) 2.09 (1.23) 3.15 (1.31)
Home education 2.44 (1.15) 2.43 (1.14) 2.03 (1.15) 2.43 (1.23)
Nonvaccination 1.93 (1.03) 2.14 (1.22) 1.94 (1.09) 2.12 (1.11)
Note. 5-point scales (1 to 5).
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Islam. For the endorsement of Muslim minority
rights, the non-Muslim Dutch participants rejected
the right to found separate schools and to burn the
national flag in a demonstration, and this rejection
was stronger for Muslim than for non-Muslim actors.
In contrast, Muslim minority participants endorsed
these rights more strongly when Muslim actors were
involved. Furthermore, participants were less accept-
ing of Muslim practices (the wearing of a headscarf)
that contrasted more strongly with other values and
operative public norms (maximal vs. minimal condi-
tion) and therefore had more far-reaching societal
consequences. This was found for both groups of
participants. However, in general, Muslim partici-
pants accepted these practices more strongly than
non-Muslims.
There were also differences between female Mus-
lim participants on the one hand and male Muslims
and male and female non-Muslims on the other.
Compared to the other three groups, Muslim females
more strongly rejected female circumcision, differen-
tial gender treatment, and home education. This
further indicates that decisions over whether some-
thing should be accepted is influenced by group
memberships: Muslim females are less accepting
when the harm or injustice ensuing from specific
practices affects them as females. This result is in
agreement with intergroup theories (e.g., Tajfel &
Turner, 1979) andwith stigma approaches (e.g., Swim
& Stangor, 1998) but, for example, not with the idea
that females are more likely to use a care or welfare
perspective, whereas males would reason more from
a rights perspective (Gilligan, 1982). The responses of
the non-Muslim females did not differ from the non-
Muslim males and the Muslim males. The practices
presented in the scenarios have implications for
Muslim females in particular and therefore caused
Muslim female participants to reject these practices
more strongly.
Existing research on freedom of speech and rights
has not examined the role of, for example, religious,
gender and national identity (see Helwig & Turiel,
2002; Neff & Helwig, 2002). However, intergroup
research and the present findings indicate that it is
important to consider these social identities. The
group memberships that are at stake and the existing
intergroup context influence how majority and
minority group children and adolescents evaluate
practices and claims of different groups (see Bennett
& Sani, 2004). The differences found between the
Muslim and non-Muslim participants are in agree-
ment with their specific group positions in Dutch
society and do not support the idea that freedoms and
rights are of little concern toMuslims or contradictory
to Islam (see also Turiel & Wainryb, 1998). Muslims
are less in favor of freedom of speechwhen it involves
offending religion and they are more in favor of
Muslim minority rights. Their judgments are quite
similar to non-Muslims, however, when their group
membership is not at stake.Hence, it seems important
for future studies on the reasoning about freedom of
speech andminority rights to examine the intergroup
context and to include measures of, for example,
national, religious, and ethnic group identification.
In addition to the differences between the partici-
pant groups, therewere also similarities. For example,
all participants rejected freedom of speech when it
involved psychological and physical harm, and the
rejection was stronger for the latter than the former
type of harm (see also Helwig, 1995). Furthermore, in
agreement with other studies (e.g., Wainryb et al.,
1998; Witenberg, 2002), adolescents made a clear
distinction between dimensions of acceptance in the
four scenarios about parental practices. They were
more accepting of parents campaigning for public
support for these practices than for the actual act
itself. This was found for all groups of participants.
Not only is the higher acceptance of the public
expression of the dissenting beliefs consistent with
the idea of free speech but also can be seen as
stimulating debate and as causing less direct harm
or injustice than the actual act.
Participants were also more accepting of practices
based on dissenting informational beliefs than on
dissenting moral beliefs. This result is also in agree-
ment with other studies (e.g., Wainryb, 1993;Wainryb
et al., 1998) but was only found for two of the four
scenarios. For female circumcision and nonvaccina-
tion no difference for belief type was found. This
might be due to the fact that these two cases are about
physical integrity and well-being, which are clear
moral issues. These two practices were also the most
strongly rejected by the participants. In addition, the
effects for belief type were found for both non-
Muslim and Muslim participants, for males and
females, and for all age groups. These results are in
agreement with the social-cognitive domain model
and with research that has found that children and
adolescents identify moral considerations as general
and generalizable to a variety of contexts and groups
(Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 2002). In contrast, informa-
tional beliefs are similar to social-conventional issues
that are seen as groupand context specific and that are
applied when no clear moral issues are at stake.
The pattern of results demonstrates that adoles-
cents use different forms of social reasoning to evalu-
ate complex social issues of free speech and minority
rights. In contrast to the idea of an age-related
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progression from less to more principled reasoning,
the present results show few and no consistent age
effects (see also Helwig, 1995, 1997; Ruck et al., 1998).
Younger participants endorsed freedom of speech
more strongly in the case of the film director, yet
older participants rejected the right to demonstrate
more strongly than younger participants did. In
addition, we found that age made a difference in
combination with other characteristics, such as par-
ticipant group and gender (see also Helwig, 1997).
There was a complex age effect, for example, for the
endorsement ofMuslimminority rights involving the
wearing of a headscarf. For non-Muslim males, age
was negatively related to the endorsement of these
rights, whereas for Muslim females a positive effect
for age was found. These results might be related to
adolescents’ growing political awareness involving
religious and gender group relations and interests.
Overall, the findings strongly suggest that judgments
about free speech and minority rights do not develop
through a stage-like sequence where a less accepting
attitude is followed by a more accepting one. A
decision of whether a particular expression or prac-
tice should be accepted always involves a variety of
considerations, and the results show that adolescents
weigh different aspects of behaviors and their con-
texts and consequences.
There are some limitations of the current research
that should be considered and that give additional
suggestions for further study. For example, the cross-
sectional design of the current study does not allow to
determine whether the age differences found are due
to developmental differences in social reasoning or to
some other factor such as context and cohort effects.
A domain-specific perspective does not imply that
developments in reasoning about rights and civil
liberties do not occur in adolescence (see Helwig &
Turiel, 2002). There are age-related changes in the
ability to conceptualize and assess the information of
complex situations and in coordinating different
domains of knowledge. These changes do not, how-
ever, necessarily lead to different judgments. Younger
and older adolescents can make the same judgment,
although for different reasons.
It also seems pertinent for future studies to assess
other types of belief. Social-cognitive domain theory
makes a distinction between moral considerations,
social-conventional issues, and psychological concerns.
We examined the difference between moral and infor-
mational beliefs (Wainryb et al., 1998). However, the
distinctionbetween the twomaynot alwaysbe straight-
forward and can also be operationalized in different
ways. For example, religious and cultural expectations
do not have to indicate moral considerations but
may also involve social-conventional concerns (Turiel,
2002). In addition, there are different kinds of moral
principles, such as fairness and equality, and dif-
ferent kinds of social-conventional issues, such as
group functioning and tradition. Furthermore, psy-
chological concerns can be involved in judgments
because what one is asked to accept or endorse may
affect personal freedoms and interests (e.g., Helwig,
1997).
Furthermore, the research has examined only a re-
stricted number of instances of freedom of speech and
minority rights. Questions of freedom of speech and
minority rights, however, involve many situations
and issues and might also depend on the national
context. Hence, it would be interesting to systemati-
cally conduct cross-national research among both
majority and minority groups on the development
of conceptions of different freedoms and rights.
Despite these qualification and limitations, we
think that the present research makes a contribution
to our understanding of the development of the
reasoning about free speech and minority rights and
by doing so also of our understanding of intergroup
relations in diverse societies. There is a large body of
research into ethnic and racial stereotypes and preju-
dice, including studies in European countries such as
the Netherlands (e.g., Verkuyten & Thijs, 2001, 2002).
This research, however, does not focus on religious
differences, whereas religion, and Islam in particular,
has emerged as the focus of immigration and diver-
sity debates in Europe (Zolberg & Long, 1999).
Furthermore, this research examines group percep-
tions and evaluations and not the social reasoning
about civil liberties and minority practices. These
latter topics, however, are at the heart of what is
perceived as a ‘‘crisis of multiculturalism’’ (Modood
& Ahmad, 2007).
Little is known about adolescents’ attitudes toward
out-groups, about their intergroup social reasoning,
and about the development of their views on civil
liberties. However, understanding these views is an
important research goal both theoretically and prac-
tically. Theoretically,weused social-cognitive domain
theory and intergroup theories and we tried to show
that it is important to examine questions of civil
liberties, and morality more generally, in the context
of intergroup relations. We agree with Killen et al.
(2006) that cognitive domain theory has tended to
ignore the intergroup context, whereas intergroup
theories have tended to ignore issues revolving
around morality. Practically, a diverse, equal, and
peaceful society does not require that we all like each
other, but it does necessarily mean that people have
learned to accept one another and endorse equal civil
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liberties. We need to understand how children and
adolescents think about free speech and minority
rights and develop less or more accepting judgments.
The present research has tried to make a contribution
to this understanding.
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